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( i) Considering Article J .4 of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision contained in the declaration of the 
member states ofWEU at Maastricht on lOth December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component 
of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Considering the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 on strengthening WEU's operational role 
through the establishment of a Planning Cell with a number of operational tasks; 
(iii) Welcoming the fact that, in the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of Ministers of 
WEU has confirmed the importance which it attaches to the continued operational development of WEU; 
(iv) Welcoming the decisions taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 10th-11th January 
1994 giving full support to the development of a European security and defence identity and to the streng-
thening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance through Western European Union as the defence 
component of the European Union; 
(v) Welcoming the NATO summit meeting's decision to endorse the concept of combined joint task 
forces (CJTF) which will provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed 
by NATO or WEU; 
(vi) Considering that the abovementioned decisions will make sense only if the Council attaches the 
highest priority to strengthening WEU's operational role; 
(vii) Noting, however, that a clear definition ofWEU's requirements for the implementation of the CJTF 
concept will have to be accompanied by the establishment of a clear command and control structure pro-
viding the indispensable political-military interface for WEU operations in view of the vital importance of 
the CJTF concept for the relevance and effectiveness of future WEU activities and operations; 
(viii) Considering that in order to be able to operate in a satisfactory way, WEU will have to benefit from 
NATO and national intelligence; 
(ix) Stressing that the Planning Cell should have appropriate infrastructure and communication links 
with NATO which would allow WEU to perform its tasks as stated in the final communique of NATO's 
January 1994 Brussels summit meeting, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Attach the highest priority to the formulation of a common European defence policy in order to pro-
vide a clear reference framework for the activities of the Planning Cell and all other organs of WEU; 
2. For the time being, allow the Planning Cell to concentrate on the three main tasks as formulated in 
the Petersberg declaration: 
- keeping an updated list of units and combination of units which would be allocated to WEU for 
specific operations; 
- preparing contingency plans for employment of forces under WEU auspices; 
- preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrange-
ments, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; 
while ensuring that it can fully participate in, and furthermore work on, the implementation process of the 
CJTF concept which is vital for WEU's operational role; 
3. Ensure that national capitals provide full co-operation with the Planning Cell and urgently settle the 
remaining shortcomings in relations between the Planning Cell and NATO in order to help the Planning 
Cell implement its basic tasks; 
4. Further promote the extension of existing contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and 
the United Nations and, in particular, between the WEU Planning Cell and the United Nations Secretary-
General's Military Adviser in New York; 
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5. For the planning and possible implementation of peace support operations, adopt the terminology 
employed in the United Nations Agenda for Peace; 
6. Avoid the multiplication of mandates given to the Planning Cell, if this is not accompanied by a cor-
responding enlargement of its staff; 
7. After assessing the Planning Cell's activities and its internal organisation by 1st October 1994, 
make the basic choice between maintaining the present military liaison group with limited capability or 
establishing a military planning centre which should be able to carry out the numerous planning tasks and 
other activities which the Council may have in mind; 
8. Ensure that the rotation of Planning Cell personnel will be achieved with a minimum of 
discontinuity; 
9. Promote the internal coherence of the Planning Cell by ensuring that all staff members are remune-




(submitted by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. It is about a year ago now that the Planning 
Cell was officially granted its full operational 
capability. According to the Secretary-General's 
initial timetable, a full review of the internal orga-
nisation and activities of the Planning Cell should 
be made by 1st October 1994. 
2. In the past year, the Assembly, which has 
welcomed and supported the establishment of a 
Planning Cell as a valuable contribution to 
WEU's operational capability, has closely fol-
lowed its activities. 
3. At this juncture, it seems useful to present a 
first succinct evaluation of the Planning Cell's 
activities as seen by the Assembly and to offer 
some indications and recommendations for the 
way ahead. The present report does not, and can-
not, claim to be exhaustive. It is therefore focused 
on a number of issues which are considered to be 
of primordial importance for the development of 
WEU's operational capabilities and the proper 
functioning of the Planning Cell in that frame-
work. 
II. Establishment and tasks 
4. On 19th June 1992, the Council of WEU 
meeting in Petersberg decided that on 1st October 
of that same year, a planning cell would be estab-
lished under the authority of the Council. 
5. According to the Petersberg declaration, 
the Planning Cell would be responsible for: 
- preparing contingency plans for the 
employment of forces under WEU aus-
pices; 
- preparing recommendations for the 
necessary command, control and com-
munication arrangements, including 
standing operating procedures for head-
quarters which might be selected; 
- keeping an updated list of units and com-
binations of units which would be alloca-
ted to WEU for specific operations. 
6. In the terms of reference for the Planning 
Cell, the following additional tasks and responsi-
bilities are mentioned: 
- compile an inventory of rules of engage-
ment; 
- prepare standard operating procedures 
for the selected headquarters; 
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- prepare exercise plans and evaluate the 
results of exercises for future planning; 
- contribute its expertise to wider reflec-
tions on the development of a military 
capability for WEU. 
7. In an emergency crisis, it would further 
have to: 
- provide advice to the WEU authorities 
on the practicability and nature of any 
WEU involvement; 
- co-ordinate the preparation of deploy-
ment of forces under WEU auspices until 
this function is assumed by a nominated 
joint headquarters. 
8. The Planning Cell is responsible to the 
Council which, in peacetime, will issue overall 
directives on planning options and priorities to the 
Planning Cell. The Director reports to the Council 
following prior examination of the work by the 
WEU Chiefs of Defence staff or by the represen-
tatives of member countries' military authorities. 
9. According to its terms of reference, the 
Planning Cell needs to ensure, through liaison 
with the appropriate authorities, that it is able to 
monitor the situation in potential trouble-spots 
and follow its development. 
10. Since the Planning Cell was considered to 
be the focus for contingency planning involving 
WEU forces, it would have to ensure that it had 
satisfactory contacts and communications with 
nations and national headquarters staffs, head-
quarters nominated for military operations under 
WEU auspices, as well as with other international 
bodies and organisations which might have a role 
in possible contingencies. 
11. The Planning Cell would also have to liaise 
as necessary with the Secretariat-General, the 
Defence Representatives Group and other appro-
priate sub-groups of the Council and with the 
WEU Satellite Centre. 
12. The work of the Planning Cell was distribu-
ted among the following flve sections, each of 
which has a number of main tasks: 
(i) Co-ordination section 
Responsible for the internal co-ordination, 
as well as the external co-ordination of 
military matters with nations, the European 
Union, NATO and other international 
organisations and conferences. 
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(ii) Planning section 
The main tasks of this section are: 
- to develop operational concepts for the 
employment of military forces answer-
able to WEU; 
- to prepare and update broad operational 
plans for contingencies which may be 
undertaken by forces under WEU; 
- to maintain details of forces which 
nations may be prepared to make avail-
able for WEU operations on a case-by-
case basis; 
- to develop forces packages which will 
relate available forces to planned contin-
gencies; 
- to contribute its expertise to wider reflec-
tions on the development of a military 
capability for WEU; 
- to prepare in crises, the directive to the 
chosen commander of WEU forces, for 
approval by the WEU Council. 
(iii) Operations and exercises section 
This section must develop the more 
detailed application of the broad operatio-
nal plans for contingencies prepared by the 
planning section. 
It also formulates WEU exercise require-
ments and co-ordinates multinational exer-
cise plans and schedules, as necessary, to 
meet possible WEU contingencies. 
Finally, it is expected to consult with respec-
tive NATO bodies and member nations in 
monitoring areas of possible crisis or 
conflict and in the formulation of intelli-
gence and information requirements which 
need to be met for each specific contingency. 
( iv) Logistics and movements section 
This section is supposed to contribute to all 
contingency plans for "forces answerable 
to WEU" and defme the appropriate arran-
gements on manpower, supplies, move-
ments, medical support and financial 
aspects. 
It has to develop logistics plans for ensuring 
an adequate logistics posture of forces ans-
werable to WEU and at the same time to 
monitor developments in the fields of strate-
gic transport for deployment and resupply. 
Furthermore, it has to hold consultations on 
logistics and movement with respective 
NATO bodies and facilities of member 
nations and formulate the requirements 
which need to be met for each specific 
contingency. 
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( v) Communications section 
It must contribute to all contingency plans 
for "forces answerable to WEU", define 
appropriate arrangements for command, 
control, information systems, interoper-
ability and requirements for communication 
and electronics for respective contingency 
plans. 
As well as this, it is supposed to consider 
developments in communications within 
the alliance and nations to ensure the best 
possible awareness of available installa-
tions and formations, consult with respec-
tive national and NATO bodies to co-ordin-
ate the defined requirements for contin-
gency plans and support the Planning Cell 
in all matters of computer security and long 
lines (PTT) leasing policy and practices. 
13. For this rather ambitious programme of 
tasks, a total number of 40 staff members was 
allocated to the Planning Cell. 
14. ln October 1992, the Director, with a limi-
ted number of staff members, started to prepare 
the work of the Planning Cell in a temporary loca-
tion. While full operational capability was initi-
ally envisaged for 1st April 1993, the Planning 
Cell moved to its final location within the WEU 
headquarters on 22nd June 1993, where certain 
material and other working conditions have not 
yet been introduced. 
15. Meanwhile, it should be noted that, at its 
Luxembourg meeting on 9th May 1994, the 
Council decided that the new Central European 
associate partners of WEU may have a liaison 
arrangement with the Planning Cell. 
16. At the same time, it was made known that 
the associate members of Iceland, Norway and 
Turkey "may nominate officers to the Planning 
Cell in order to increase WEU's planning capabili-
ties and to enable WEU to draw more easily on the 
associate members' expertise and resources for the 
tasks identified in the Petersberg declaration". 
Ill. An early vision of Planning Cell activities 
17. The description of the Planning Cell's 
main tasks as set out in the Petersberg declaration 
had necessarily been rather general, but the 
newly-appointed Director, Lieutenant-General 
Marcello Caltabiano, when taking up his respon-
sibilities in October 1992, had to concentrate on 
reality and work out what should be the initial 
priority tasks. 
18. At the invitation of the WEU Assembly's 
Defence Committee, the Director of the Planning 
Cell addressed the committee for the first time at 
its meeting on 25th January 1993, providing his 
first opinion on what could be done and how. 
General Caltabiano thought it was difficult to 
define precisely WEU's geographical area of 
interest, but he assumed that it would primarily be 
in areas fairly close to Europe. 
19. Interaction of the Planning Cell with equi-
valent structures such as NATO and the United 
Nations would be paramount for achieving mili-
tary efficiency and all possible steps should be 
taken to establish clear relationships and to co-
ordinate with such bodies to avoid duplication. 
20. He emphasised that the Planning Cell's first 
task should focus on the creation and mainten-
ance of an updated list of units and combinations 
of units which nations might, on an ad hoc basis, 
make available for operations under the aegis of 
WEU. 
21. The second task would be to prepare 
recommendations for the necessary command and 
control arrangements required for any WEU oper-
ation. 
22. Another priority was the preparation of 
rules of engagement for use in military operations 
which should have commonality with NATO 
rules of engagement in order to avoid the dangers 
of ambiguity and unnecessary duplication of 
effort. On the other hand, further work was requi-
red in order to ensure that WEU rules of engage-
ment would be sufficiently flexible to take 
account of possible specific WEU missions. 
23. An exercise policy would have to be for-
mulated in the longer term, given the need for 
extensive consultation between nations and the 
need for co-ordination with existing national and 
multinational exercises. The Director's aim was 
to mount a modest command-post exercise by the 
beginning of 1994 and full field training exercises 
by the middle of the 1990s. 
24. At that moment, the Director found it diffi-
cult to foresee full operational capability for the 
Planning Cell by 1st April 1994. He also saw pro-
blems in the field of budgetary calculations since 
it was virtually impossible to see what the costs 
would be. 
25. He finally stressed that the Planning Cell 
would include representatives from all armies 
which should allow it to respond to any request 
for military advice, but he also pointed out that 
the military needed political guidelines which he 
hoped would be forthcoming. A first necessity 
for WEU might be to define a "common inter-
vention policy" to serve "common European 
interests". 
26. In the conclusions to this report, an assess-




IV. Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) 
27. When Europeans started to talk seriously 
about WEU as a European defence organisation, 
the ultimate argument of the opponents time and 
again was that WEU did not have a military 
organisation or an integrated military structure 
and that it had no troops. 
28. It is no surprise, therefore, that after the 
signature of the Maastricht Treaty with Article J .4 
on the development of a common foreign and 
security policy "including the eventual framing of 
a common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence", the Council of Minis-
ters had to take a closer look at this flaw. 
29. The first steps were taken in the Petersberg 
declaration of 19th June 1992 which set the gen-
eral framework for military units answerable to 
WEU in order to strengthen its operational rOle in 
the following paragraphs from Chapter II of the 
declaration: 
" 2. WEU member states declare that they 
are prepared to make available military 
units from the whole spectrum of their 
conventional armed forces for military 
tasks conducted under the authority of 
WEU. 
3. Decisions to use military units answer-
able to WEU will be taken by the WEU 
Council in accordance with the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter. Participation 
in specific operations will remain a sover-
eign decision of member states in accor-
dance with national constitutions. 
4. Apart from contributing to the common 
defence in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty and Article V of the 
modified Brussels Treaty respectively, 
military units of WEU member states, 
acting under the authority of WEU, could 
be employed for: 
- humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
- peace-keeping tasks; 
- tasks of combat forces in crisis-manage-
ment, including peace-making. 
5. The planning and execution of these 
tasks will be fully compatible with the mili-
tary dispositions necessary to ensure the 
collective defence of all allies. 
6. Military units will be drawn from the 
forces of WEU member states, including 
forces with NATO missions - in this case 
after consultation with NATO- and will be 
organised on a multinational and multi-
service basis. 
7. All WEU member states will soon 
designate which of their military units and 
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headquarters they would be willing to make 
available to WEU for its various possible 
tasks. Where multinational formations 
drawn from the forces of WEU nations 
already exist or are planned, these units 
could be made available for use under the 
authority of WEU, with agreement of all 
participating nations. 
8. WEU member states intend to develop 
and exercise the appropriate capabilities to 
enable the deployment of WEU military 
units by land, sea or air to accomplish these 
tasks." 
30. In fact, however, the designation of such 
forces answerable to WEU appeared to be more 
complicated than was thought initially. At its 
meeting in Rome on 19th May 1993 the WEU 
Council of Ministers "took note of the report of 
the Defence Representatives Group and mandated 
the Permanent Council to reach timely conclu-
sions and to present a progress report to the next 
ministerial meeting on the forces answerable to 
WEU, in particular for the conduct of humanita-
rian and peace-keeping operations." 
31. The third task of such forces as mentioned 
in the Petersberg declaration - to act as combat 
forces in crisis-management, including peace-
making - was no longer mentioned in the mand-
ate for the Permanent Council because the new 
mandate was understood to connect with the 
dynamic concept of peace-keeping as used in the 
United Nations Agenda for Peace. 
32. As is known, the United Nations Agenda 
for Peace makes a distinction between the follow-
ing different activities in United Nations sponso-
red peace-support operations: peace-making, 
peace-building, peace-enforcement and peace-
keeping. In this concept, peace-making is a politi-
cal and diplomatic process which does not imply 
the projection of military force. Peace-building is 
defined as an "action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict". A following phase, peace-keeping, 
includes "the deployment of a United Nations pre-
sence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all 
the parties concerned, normally involving United 
Nations military and/or police personnel and fre-
quently civilians as well". 
33. It is recommended here that organisations 
such as WEU, which might take action under the 
aegis of a United Nations mandate, adopt the ter-
minology of the United Nations Agenda for Peace 
for the various peace support operations to pre-
vent misunderstandings as regards the different 
possible activities. 
34. In this framework of relations between 
WEU and the United Nations, Recommendation 
542 is recalled, in which the WEU Assembly 
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asked the Council to instruct the Planning Cell to 
offer advice for the United Nations Secretary-
General's Military Adviser in New York, espe-
cially with a view to facilitating the creation of a 
similar Planning Cell for the United Nations. 
35. In its reply to this recommendation, the 
Council recognised the importance of increased 
contacts and exchanges of information between 
the United Nations and WEU. It recognised that 
WEU contributions in the field of planning and 
periodic contacts between the Planning Cell 
representatives and the responsible United 
Nations staff could be of real value. In a letter 
addressed to his United Nations counterpart, 
dated 25th June 1993, the WEU Secretary-
General proposed to step up contacts and 
exchanges of information between both organisa-
tions. 
36. Since the Council's reply of 14th October 
1993, no further details have been made known 
officially, and it seems that contacts between the 
WEU Planning Cell and relevant United Nations 
staff are more ad hoc than periodic. 
37. At the ministerial meeting of22nd Novem-
ber 1993, it was made clear that the European 
corps, the multinational division (central) and the 
Anglo-Dutch amphibious force had already been 
declared as multinational forces answerable to 
WEU (FAWEU). 
38. As regards national forces which could be 
put under the authority of WEU, there were prob-
lems which had not yet been solved. 
39. At that same meeting, ministers endorsed 
the ''joint declaration stating the conditions for the 
use of the European corps in the framework of 
Western European Union" which had earlier been 
adopted by the three states participating in the 
European corps (Belgium, France and Germany). 
Recently, similar joint declarations have been 
adopted setting the conditions for the use of the 
Belgian/German/N etherlands/United Kingdom 
multinational division (central) and the United 
Kingdom/ Netherlands amphibious force in the 
framework ofWEU and the understandings regar-
ding these matters. 
40. In the joint declaration regarding the Euro-
pean corps, a prominent r61e is given to the WEU 
Planning Cell, which should formulate plans for 
the use of the European corps within WEU. The 
role of the Planning Cell is specified in a number 
of paragraphs creating the impression of an extre-
mely narrow co-operation with the European 
corps. It should be noted, however, that a number 
of clarifications given by the military delegates 
of the three countries participating in the Euro-
pean corps providing an interpretation of the 
declaration to which they are attached severely 
limit the active involvement of WEU and its 
Planning Cell. 
41. The joint declaration stipulates that the 
Commander of the European corps will keep the 
Planning Cell regularly informed on such issues 
as manpower, equipment and weapons of the 
corps units which may act in WEU operations, the 
assets and infrastructure to be used for logistic 
support, training objectives and exercise pro-
grammes and operational capability. It is further 
stipulated that the Planning Cell Director will 
inform the states participating in the European 
corps of his assessments and proposals regarding 
the training of units, preparation and conduct of 
exercises, organisation of communications and 
logistic support and interoperability. 
42. The Planning Cell's planning in this frame-
work should take the practical form of generic 
plans and contingency plans. These ambitious 
objectives are far less impressive if it is known 
that, according to the interpretation attached to the 
declaration, the Director of the Planning Cell will 
provide his assessments and proposals "on the 
basis of the current terms of reference and 
resources of the Planning Cell" which, as is well 
known and also admitted by the Planning Cell 
itself, are not sufficient by far for performing 
these tasks. The same attached interpretation sti-
pulates that for the purpose of generic planning, 
no direct links are necessary between the Planning 
Cell and the European corps. 
43. While the joint declaration states that the 
European corps, in order to maintain relations bet-
ween WEU and the corps, will be in permanent 
liaison with the WEU Planning Cell, the defini-
tion of and arrangements for this permanent liai-
son, to be approved by the Council, still remain to 
be agreed more than six months after the adoption 
of the joint declaration. 
44. One may wonder whether such working 
methods actually contribute to efficiency. Was the 
establishment of the European corps really inten-
ded to be the frrst step towards a European army 
or just another public relations exercise without 
intrinsic value? It is noted here that the mere addi-
tion of the prefix "Euro" or attributive "Euro-
pean" is not enough to make armed units an inte-
gral part of a European defence identity. 
45. On the other hand, it can be well under-
stood that member states are reluctant to transfer 
full command over their armed units to an organi-
sation which does not have a proper general staff. 
46. Also on 22nd November 1993, the WEU 
Council approved a report on relations between 
forces answerable to WEU (FA WEU). It was estab-
lished that two different categories of FA WEU 
could be distinguished: 
- national FAWEU, military units and 
headquarters designated by states which 
can be made available to carry out tasks 
conducted under the authority of WEU; 
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- multinational FAWEU, established mul-
tinational military units and headquar-
ters, existing and future, jointly designa-
ted for the same purpose by the partici-
pating states. 
47. For the use ofFAWEU, three categories of 
plans should be developed: generic plans, contin-
gency plans and operation plans. In this planning 
process, an important role was attributed to the 
Planning Cell. 
48. The Planning Cell is to develop generic 
plans for possible operations where some of the 
planning factors have not yet been fully identified 
or cannot be assumed. In this framework, illustra-
tive force packages should be identified. For this 
kind of planning, direct links with units were not 
thought to be necessary. 
49. The Council can ask the Planning Cell to 
develop contingency plans for possible operations 
where the planning factors have been identified or 
can be assumed. These plans are more detailed 
and include the forces needed and options for 
deployment. At this stage of the planning process, 
those nations interested may provide details 
regarding their possible or intended contributions. 
Logically, it is thought that while developing 
contingency plans, the Planning Cell will have to 
be able to communicate directly with those units 
earmarked for possible deployment. 
50. When the Council has decided to mount a 
specific operation, it will designate an Operation 
Commander, who is responsible for drawing up an 
operation plan normally based on earlier generic 
and contingency plans. Once the Council has 
approved the operation plan, contributing member 
states will transfer their designated military units 
under command of the Operation Commander. 
51. As regards the command and control of 
WEU operations, it has been established that the 
overall political control will rest with the WEU 
Council, while the full command of a WEU force 
deployed in an operation is retained by the nations 
to whom the forces belong. 
52. It should be noted here that, in accordance 
with the abovementioned arrangements, FA WEU 
are forces available to WEU rather than forces 
answerable to WEU, which is the misleading ter-
minology used by the Council. 
53. While, in general, the Planning Cell should 
have contact with FA WEU through the national 
capitals, it can, subject to the agreement of the 
relevant nations, consult national staffs and the 
staffs of FA WEU in preparing plans. It has also 
been decided that, when developing contingency 
plans, the Planning Cell can be supported by 
national and multinational headquarters. 
54. One of the Planning Cell's important 
resources for generic planning, contingency plan-
DOCUMENT 1421 
ning and the identification of force packages is the 
defence planning questionnaire, a document 
which is periodically updated by all NATO mem-
ber states and which is supposed to provide a 
reliable and detailed survey of each nation's 
armed forces. 
55. It was therefore agreed that each member 
state should present its list of FA WEU as replies 
to the defence planning questionnaire (DPQ) or, if 
need be, as replies to a specific questionnaire for-
mulated by the Planning Cell. The Planning Cell 
should then make its assessment of the informa-
tion gathered, collect further information if nee-
ded and then produce the list ofFAWEU. The list 
of FA WEU should then be the basis for the deve-
lopment of force packages. 
56. At present, most of the preparatory work 
has been completed, an initial list has been pro-
duced and it is expected that the complete list of 
FAWEU will be presented to the Ministerial 
Council at the end of 1994. 
57. There has been criticism that, twelve 
months after the mandate given in Rome, a list of 
FAWEU is still not available. It has indeed taken a 
long time, but at least part of the criticism of the 
Planning Cell is unfair for a number of reasons. 
58. Initially, member states replied in different 
ways to the Planning Cell's questions. Some said 
that all conventional forces were potentially avail-
able while others preferred to provide a list with spe-
cific units. There were questions as to whether spe-
cific units and their equipment should be made avai-
lable at a given time. On the other hand, nations 
which were prepared to provide units were hesita-
ting to be too specific because they wanted to retain 
a certain flexibility in case units would be needed for 
other tasks. France, not participating in NATO's 
military structures, took longer to provide the 
replies. Furthermore, there were differing opinions 
on the question whether forces especially suited for 
humanitarian operations could be distinguished 
from others while the activity called "peace-keep-
ing" turned out to be subject to change due to recent 
experiences all over the world. Meanwhile, the Plan-
ning Cell itself had only just started its work. Its staff 
had to settle into the new environment, and - need-
less to say - there was also some infighting in struc-
tures which were accustomed to work only with 
NATO as the co-ordinating organisation. 
V. Combined joint task forces (CJTF) 
59. A major step forward on the road towards 
the creation of operational capabilities for WEU 
was taken at the NATO summit meeting in Brus-
sels on 10th-11th January 1994. 
60. At this summit meeting, it was decided that 
the alliance's organisation and resources would be 
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adjusted so as to facilitate the development of 
WEU as the defence component of the European 
Union. It was also stated that the alliance stood 
ready to make collective assets available, on the 
basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Coun-
cil, for WEU operations. 
61. In their declaration, the heads of state and 
government further said: "We also will need to 
strengthen the European pillar of the alliance by 
facilitating the use of our military capabilities for 
NATO and European/WEU operations .... "To 
improve, among other things, co-operation with 
WEU and to reflect the emerging European secu-
rity and defence identity, they endorsed "the 
concept of combined joint task forces as a means 
to facilitate contingency operations, including 
operations with participating nations outside the 
alliance". 
62. The North Atlantic Council, with the 
advice of the NATO military authorities, was 
directed to develop this concept and establish the 
necessary capabilities. In co-ordination with 
WEU, it would work on implementation in a man-
ner that would provide "separable but not separ-
ate" military capabilities that could be employed 
by NATO or WEU. 
63. Work on the implementation of the CJTF 
concept started immediately after the summit 
meeting. As could have been expected, there was 
no immediate agreement over the interpretation of 
the wording in the summit declaration. In an early 
working definition, however, military authorities 
at NATO defined a CJTF headquarters as a 
deployable, multinational, multiservice headquar-
ters of variable size, formed to command joint 
forces of NATO and, possibly, non-NATO 
nations, for the purpose of conducting peace ope-
rations outside the territory of NATO. A NATO 
CJTF headquarters could also be detached for 
European-led (WEU) operations. It is assumed 
that for the composition of a CJTF headquarters, 
elements will be drawn from CINCENT, 
AFSOUTH and AFNORTHWEST. At the 
moment, work on the CJTF concept is continuing 
and it is hoped that the final conclusions can be 
presented in December 1994. 
64. Implementation of the CJTF concept will 
enable WEU to mount out-of-area operations in 
circumstances where the United States prefers not 
to deploy its armed forces and will finally do 
away with the argument that WEU does not have 
a proper military command structure. 
65. At WEU, it is emphasised that in such pos-
sible WEU operations, a CJTF headquarters can 
only be effective if essential collective alliance 
assets such as satellite intelligence and AWACS 
are available at the same time. 
66. Evidently, the Planning Cell has an impor-
tant role to play in the CJTF implementation pro-
cess. Upon request from the WEU Council, it 
made a preliminary analysis of the consequences 
of CJTF on the WEU operational concept which 
was submitted to it a few weeks after the NATO 
summit meeting. The Council then established a 
specific CJTF political-military working group to 
prepare the WEU response to the NATO summit 
meeting and authorised the Planning Cell to take 
part in the working group's meetings and support 
its work. 
67. At the same time, the Planning Cell was 
authorised to be an observer in the NATO military 
transitional issues working group which is now 
making an assessment of the military aspects of 
the last NATO summit's decision to adapt the 
alliance's structures and procedures. 
68. It should be noted that the military authori-
ties of NATO at SHAPE headquarters, working at 
the implementation of the CJTF concept, have 
been doing this until now without any support or 
guidance from NATO's political structures. 
Seemingly, one nation, notably in favour of the 
development of a European defence identity, is 
blocking positive progress on the CJTF issue in 
the political structure. 
69. It should be emphasised here that CJTF 
will make little sense for WEU if it does not 
create the appropriate political-military infra-
structure to deal with it effectively. Even if some 
progress has been made, the existing infrastructu-
re is still largely ad hoc. 
70. For command and control of operations as 
envisaged in the CJTF concept, a strategic inter-
face is required between political and military 
structures, an element still missing in WEU. The 
prevailing command and control regulations in 
WEU operations have been agreed on an ad hoc 
basis, lacking universality. 
71. The Planning Cell has now produced a first 
analysis of command and control of WEU opera-
tions for discussion by the relevant WEU bodies. 
It seems that this subject needs high priority atten-
tion if WEU takes its role seriously. 
VI. WEU strategic mobility study 
72. After the Gulf war, in Recommendation 
501, the WEU Assembly having established that 
there were important shortcomings in Western 
European strategic transport capabilities, had 
asked the Council to study the possibility of setting 
up a European strategic airlift command equipped 
with a military version of the Airbus A 340 and 
operating in a WEU framework. In its reply, the 
Council made it known that the Defence Repre-
sentatives Group in liaison with the Special Work-
ing Group would spell out and assess, as it was 
said: "proposals to make co-operation more ope-
11 
DOCUMENT 1421 
rational both in the politico-military field as well 
as in the military field proper, covering among 
other things tasks and the requirements for co-
ordination and planning structures. In this frame-
work, the structures and the lessons of the Gulf 
war will be considered." 
73. In Recommendation 515, the Assembly 
then recommended that the Council: "Urge the 
Defence Representatives Group to proceed ener-
getically with its study of a European sea- and air-
lift capability and include in this study the possi-
bility of establishing a European strategic airlift 
command in the WEU framework." 
74. The Council replied on 26th March 1992: 
"The desirability and feasibility of setting up new 
bodies in the WEU framework, such as a Euro-
pean strategic airlift command, will have to be 
examined taking into account the discussion by 
the DRG of the conclusions of a bilateral study 
undertaken by France and Germany in the frame-
work of the appraisal of the lessons to be drawn 
from the Gulf conflict." 
75. This Franco-German study on European 
requirements for strategic mobility initially 
remained without follow-up. The establishment 
of the Planning Cell apparently opened new pers-
pectives to examine problems of this nature and 
after a proposal of the Chiefs of Defence Staffs 
(CHODs), the Council decided on 27th April 
1993 that under the aegis of the Planning Cell, a 
WEU strategic mobility study (WSMS) should be 
initiated. For this study, the Planning Cell would 
be assisted by national movements experts of the 
member states while the Franco-German study 
was used for further analysis. 
76. It should be acknowledged that here also in 
the beginning little progress was made due to a 
number of reasons. Since there were no WEU 
operational guidelines nor contingency plans 
available, the Planning Cell had the feeling that 
there was no sound basis for a strategic mobility 
concept in a WEU framework. Some member 
states on the other hand argued that the original 
working hypotheses, partly based on the Franco-
German study, were far too ambitious in that they 
put too much emphasis on massive air transport of 
heavy equipment. 
77. A convergence of ideas has now taken 
place, which has resulted in a more realistic 
approach. The study will now be conducted in 
two different phases. Phase 1, to be concluded at 
the end of 1994, will provide an evaluation of the 
existing strategic mobility capabilities in WEU 
through simulation of the deployment of force 
packages up to the size of a division over short, 
medium and long range. Here, one of the prob-
lems faced by the Planning Cell experts was that, 
due to national restrictions, not all national 
experts were able to provide estimates of the avai-
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!ability of military and civil sea and air transport 
assets to support WEU force deployments. 
78. Phase 2, to be concluded in 1995, will pro-
vide a WEU strategic mobility concept. In this 
framework, an analysis will be given of co-ordi-
nation measures and procedures for the pooling 
of national transport assets and for circum-
stances where WEU would have to make an 
appeal to the civil transport market, in particular 
to protect competitive bidding. With the support 
of Euroflag, an additional analysis will be given 
based on the assumption that the future large air-
craft {FLA) would be available for WEU deploy-
ments. The possible acquisition of dedicated 
strategic transport assets will also be subject to 
analysis. 
79. In order to ensure that the WEU strategic 
mobility capability will be complementary to and 
compatible with that of NATO, the work of the 
Planning Cell on WSMS will have to be co-ordin-
ated with NATO's movement, transportation and 
mobility management advisory group. 
80. With most probably the final result of 
WSMS to be expected by the end of 1995, it will 
indeed have taken a long time. On the other hand, 
it should be admitted that here again, as men-
tioned above, many different factors have contri-
buted to a slow start. 
VII. Other aspects of planning activities 
(a) Maritime co-operation: Combined Endeavour 
81. Based on an initiative of France, Italy and 
Spain to examine the possibility of promoting 
forms of aero-maritime co-operation among 
WEU member countries, the Planning Cell was 
tasked to pursue this idea in October 1992. This 
was implemented by developing an operational 
plan, providing a mechanism for the generation 
and initial deployment of maritime forces, inclu-
ding maritime air forces in close co-operation and 
consultation with the Military Delegates and the 
Defence Representatives Group. These activities 
now have resulted in WEU operational plan Com-
bined Endeavour. At its meeting on 9th May 
1994, the WEU Council approved this operational 
plan and agreed that such an initiative should be 
developed further in accordance with the initial 
mandate. Combined Endeavour enables WEU to 
generate and initially deploy maritime forces and 
to identify maritime force packages for certain 
tasks. 
82. It can also be used in combination with any 
other plan for which maritime forces would be 
required and as the starting mechanism for and the 
initial phase of a maritime exercise involving the 
WEU crisis-management organisation and mari-
time forces. 
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(b) Humanitarian missions including generic 
evacuation planning 
83. At its meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd 
November 1993, the Council tasked the Planning 
Cell "in completing the list of FA WEU incorpora-
ting national inputs, to identify forces especially 
suited for humanitarian tasks". In parallel with its 
work on the list of FAWEU, it is now developing 
a data base for contingency planning in the field 
of humanitarian missions. In this framework, 
links are being developed with the United Nations 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) 
and with the European Community Humanitarian 
Organisation (ECHO). 
84. In the specific field of generic evacuation 
planning, a report has now been drafted in order to 
examine whether and how WEU can make a 
contribution to work already being done else-
where, in particular within the European Union. A 
generic plan for WEU evacuation operations has 
been drafted. Moreover, a study is being made of 
lessons learned from the recent evacuation opera-
tions in R wanda. 
85. More recently, the Permanent Council dis-
cussed the possibility of a WEU contribution to 
the evacuation of citizens who might be forced to 
leave Yemen because of the civil war. The Plan-
ning Cell has contacted the authorities of the 
countries concerned. 
(c) Peace-keeping missions 
86. A document on WEU involvement in 
peace-keeping missions is now almost completed. 
This document includes a description of basic 
principles, the conditions for any WEU involve-
ment, the missions and tasks of peace-keeping 
forces, generic planning considerations and the 
characteristics and composition of forces. 
(d) Exercise activity 
87. The Planning Cell has been in close liaison 
with United Kingdom planning authorities for the 
command post exercise Purple Nova 1994 on eva-
cuation, which is the first exercise of this kind to 
be planned and conducted within a WEU frame-
work. Among the Planning Cell's objectives for 
this exercise are the rehearsal of WEU crisis-
management procedures, and the provision of 
experience for its staff in planning, co-ordinating 
and conducting command post exercises within 
the context of WEU. 
88. The Planning Cell is also involved in pre-
parations for the tri-national (Italy, France and 
Spain) major exercise Tramontana, with Spain as 
the host nation, and the possible participation of 
other WEU member states. 
89. At the Planning Cell, it is hoped that both 
exercises will help to analyse command, control 
and communications structures for WEU evacua-
tion operations and also to study standard opera-
ting procedures and rules of engagement. 
VIII. Contingency planning 
90. On some occasions, the Planning Cell has 
been involved in contingency planning for speci-
fic operations. 
(a) Safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
91. In July 1993, the Planning Cell was asked 
to examine the possibility for WEU member 
states to participate in the protection of safe areas 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina designated by the United 
Nations Security Council. The Planning Cell's 
questions as to which forces could be provided by 
member states mostly met with negative replies 
and further planning had to be given up. 
(b) Administration of the Mostar district and 
other activities regarding the former Republic 
of Yugoslavia 
92. Upon request by the Council in September 
1993, the Planning Cell prepared a study on the 
problems which the European Union might face 
in a possible administration role in the Mostar dis-
trict. This study was made in close contact with 
NATO, the United Nations, the European Com-
munity monitoring mission and other organisa-
tions involved in activities in the Mostar district. 
After submission of a detailed report, the Plan-
ning Cell was asked to develop a general plan for 
any support from WEU in the medical field for 
the possible European Community administration 
in the Mostar district. This general plan was sub-
mitted to the Council in December 1993, but will 
have to be updated as the situation changes. 
Recently, after a fact-fmding mission, the Plan-
ning Cell made an assessment of the security 
environment for the possible European Union 
administration. 
93. The staff of the Planning Cell remained 
involved in WEU's commitment to operation 
Sharp Guard in the Adriatic. Moreover, the Plan-
ning Cell presents a weekly written report to the 
Permanent Council with the aim of informing the 
Council about developments in the situation in the 
former republic of Yugoslavia and current opera-
tions such as Deny Flight, Sharp Guard and the 
embargo enforcement on the Danube. 
(c) Multinational formations 
94. In the framework of the planning for pro-
tection of safe areas, the Planning Cell was also 
asked to prepare a study on the possibility for the 
establishment of multinational formations. Mem-
ber states provided widely diverging replies on 
the Planning Cell's questions regarding this sub-
ject. After the NATO summit's decision to deve-
lop the CJTF concept, it was decided to stop work 
on this issue for the time being. 
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IX. Operational capability 
and infrastructure 
95. Although it is admitted that progress has 
been made since the Planning Cell frrst started its 
work in temporary premises in Brussels, several 
issues of vital importance for the work of the 
Planning Cell and even for WEU as an organisa-
tion in general, have not yet been solved. 
96. Firstly, there is still no satisfactory solution 
for the communication links. The WEUCOM sys-
tem, developed some years ago for communica-
tions between the WEU Secretariat-General and 
the national capitals of the member states, is 
considered to be too slow and its performance 
insufficient. For its secure links with the capitals, 
the Planning Cell has now a secure telephone link 
borrowed from Italy and a secure fax borrowed 
from France. 
97. One year after its official establishment, the 
Planning Cell does not yet have the possibility to 
use NATO's Initial Voice Switch Network and 
Telegraphic Automatic Relay Equipment, while 
the completion of internal security standards com-
patible with those of NATO is still pending. 
Indeed, the secretariats of both WEU and NATO 
are working on memoranda of understanding in 
these areas, but it seems that the main hurdle is the 
funding problem. With the essential CJTF 
concept now having to be implemented in co-
ordination between NATO and WEU, a solution 
for these communication problems can no longer 
be delayed. 
98. Secondly, the Planning Cell needs to have 
access to NATO and national intelligence inclu-
ding secret material if its work is to be taken 
seriously. An intelligence agreement between 
WEU and NATO is urgently needed, and it is 
thought that discussions to prepare its conclusion 
should start without delay. Meanwhile, it seems 
that work has started already on a separate agree-
ment between the two organisations regarding 
the exchange of information on a day-by-day 
basis. 
X. The Kirchberg declaration 
and the Planning Cell 
99. Time and again, the Assembly wonders 
how seriously the WEU Council takes its role of 
strengthening the European security and defence 
identity and, in particular, WEU's operational 
capabilities. In fact, it cannot get away from the 
impression that the Council is indulging in solemn 
declarations without paying due attention to their 
follow-up. 
100. The Council's Kirchberg declaration is a 
point in case, to be considered here as related to 
the Planning Cell's activities. 
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101. In the Kirchberg declaration, the Council 
stated among other things: 
"They welcomed the [January 1994 Atlan-
tic Alliance] summit's endorsement of the 
principle that collective assets and capabili-
ties of the alliance can be made available 
for WEU operations in order to strengthen 
WEU as the defence component of the 
European Union and as the means to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlan-
tic Alliance. They underlined that the 
modalities for making these available 
should preserve WEU's own planning pro-
cedures and capabilities. 
Ministers stressed the importance of work 
under way in WEU on the WED-related 
aspects of the adaptation of the alliance 
structures. In order to enhance WEU's abi-
lity to carry out the tasks defined in the 
Petersberg declaration, Ministers endorsed 
the approach to identify the assets and 
capabilities required to perform the neces-
sary military functions." 
102. These statements should be welcomed, but 
the Council may have ignored the fact that they 
may result in additional work for a WEU Planning 
Cell which in its present limited size has conside-
rable problems in implementing its basic tasks. 
103. Ministers further said that they "underlined 
the importance of co-ordination with the alliance 
on the implementation of the CJTF concept and 
the definition of separable but not separate mili-
tary capabilities so as to ensure their effective use 
where appropriate by WEU, and in that case under 
its command." 
104. If the Council justly considers the imple-
mentation of the CJTF concept in co-ordination 
with the alliance to be of such great importance, 
why then are the problems of secure communica-
tion links between the Planning Cell and NATO, 
NATO-compatible internal security standards for 
the Planning Cell and an intelligence agreement 
between NATO and WEU still pending? 
105. As regards relations with the European 
Union, the Ministers: 
"... welcomed the fact that working rela-
tions with the European Union were now 
being developed. They also recalled their 
endorsement at their last meeting of the 
measures to ensure close co-operation bet-
ween the European Union and WEU 
contained in the conclusions of the General 
Affairs Council of 26th October 1993 and 
approved by the European Council on 29th 
October 1993. Ministers emphasised in this 
context the need to improve co-operation, 
particularly in the management of crises, 
and looked forward to close co-operation 
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between the two organisations in order to 
respond rapidly and efficiently in the event 
of crises. In this context, Ministers welco-
med the request by the European Union to 
make a contribution to a future European 
Union administration of Mostar and confrr-
med that WEU was ready to offer its sup-
port. This constituted a promising example 
of the close co-operation between WEU 
and the European Union foreseen by the 
Maastricht Treaty." 
106. The Assembly fully agrees with the Minis-
ters' opinion that co-operation between the Euro-
pean Union and WEU needs to be improved, par-
ticularly in crisis-management. 
107. It does not understand, however, the Minis-
ters' enthusiasm over WEU's possible contribu-
tion to a future European Union administration of 
Mostar. After an internal discussion, the Council, 
due to some member states' reluctance to act, 
could not offer more than "support that WEU 
might provide in the medical field". After submis-
sion of a general plan to this end, the Planning 
Cell has now made an assessment of the security 
environment. There is no reason to blame the 
Planning Cell, which did what it was asked to do, 
but in view of the situation in former Yugoslavia, 
the Council could have considered more substan-
tial contributions. 
108. In the Kirchberg declaration "Ministers 
recalled the importance they attached to the conti-
nued operational development of WEU, as the 
defence component of the European Union and as 
the means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
alliance". In view of the astonishing lack of mate-
rial support and political guidance which has until 
now characterised the relation between the Coun-
cil and the Planning Cell, this can only be called 
an excellent example of cynicism. 
109. As mentioned earlier in the present report, 
the Council decided at its Kirchberg meeting that 
the Central European associate partners may have 
a l~aison arran~ement with the Planning Cell, 
while the associate members may nominate offi-
cers to the Planning Cell. The Assembly wel-
comes this development, since it is an inherent 
reco~nition of the important role of the Planning 
Cell m the WEU structure. On the other hand it 
remains to be seen what the consequences of the 
practical arrangements made in implementation 
of the Council's decision will be for the work of 
the Planning Cell 
XI. Conclusions 
110. What can be concluded after one year of 
Planning Cell activities? 
111. Starting on the positive side, some achieve-
ments should be pointed out. 
112. First, it should be noted that, with the Plan-
ning Cell, WEU now has a military staff and 
expertise at its disposal which enables the Council 
and its Secretariat-General to have an appropriate 
or quick response to questions regarding basic 
military aspects of issues within its purview. 
113. Second, with the Planning Cell, WEU has a 
permanent and organic structure which can pro-
vide short-, medium- and long-term planning for 
the many different areas of possible WEU activi-
ties. 
114. Third, the Planning Cell can provide close 
professional links with national military authori-
ties and international military organisations such 
as NATO headquarters and the international mili-
tary staff at NATO and SHAPE. 
115. On the other hand, to the Assembly's 
regret, there is some disappointment due to expec-
tations not being met. 
116. The name Planning Cell is slightly mislead-
ing and may have created expectations too great 
for such a small group of experts. In fact, it is 
more of a military liaison group which can work 
only in close permanent contact with the appro-
priate authorities in military planning and other 
areas of military interest in the national capitals. 
Moreover, the word "planning" does not cover the 
many other activities in which the Planning Cell is 
involved according to its terms of reference. 
117. With its 40 staff members, the Planning 
Cell should in no way be compared to the huge 
950 military staff at NATO. The Planning Cell's 
just over 20 staff members involved in planning 
and related activities cannot be expected to per-
form miracles as the Council erroneously seems 
to believe. 
118. As mentioned in Chapter IX, one year after 
reaching operational capability, the question of 
secure communications with capitals and NATO 
has not yet been solved in a satisfactory manner, a 
situation which is seriously hampering the Plan-
ning Cell's work. An intelligence agreement bet-
ween WEU and NATO and, in particular, for the 
exchange of information and documents between 
the two organisations is also badly needed. 
119. A problem, mostly of a practical nature, is 
also that the limits, as defined in the financial 
regulations of the Secretariat -General, provide no 
flexibility for the Planning Cell's Director in 
managing his budget. 
120. Even more alarming is the lack of basic deci-
sions creating well-defined references for the Plan-
ning Cell's activities. At present the Planning Cell 
is therefore working in a political vacuum, lacking 
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clear political guidelines and instructions which are 
specific enough to work efficiently. Until now, the 
Council has not formulated a common European 
defence policy, which is the ultimate frame-
work of the Planning Cell's activities. The Kirchberg 
declaration offers a first perspective on the future 
work on this issue, but it could apparently still take 
time before final conclusions are reached. The 
Assembly thinks that the highest priority should be 
attached to the formulation of a common European 
defence policy. It is looking forward to the results of 
the Council's work in this area 
121. The Planning Cell is positively determined 
to perform the tasks set out in its terms of refer-
ence, but it should be noted that the multiplication 
of mandates given by the Council, combined with 
the lack of clear political guidelines and a clear 
political framework does not allow it to concen-
trate on the main tasks formulated in the Peters-
berg declaration and the corresponding priorities 
indicated by its Director at the beginning of 1993. 
122. One might reproach the Planning Cell's 
leadership for not exerting enough control over 
progress in implementing the priority tasks, but at 
the same time it should be admitted that it had to 
navigate between the Scylla of concentrating on 
priority tasks and the Charybdis of meeting all the 
new and urgent demands of the Council. 
123. It is advocated here that the original main 
tasks, in particular the completion of the list of 
FAWEU, are essential. Without this list, the Plan-
ning Cell cannot develop appropriate force pack-
ages for use in future planning. 
124. It is also thought that the important WEU 
strategic mobility study (WSMS) should be com-
pleted in the near future so as to provide the Coun-
cil with a sound basis for decisions on this essen-
tial issue. 
125. As explained in a parallel Defence Com-
mittee report 1, the Planning Cell lacks appropri-
ate means in naval matters. This may become 
increasingly important for Europe in view of 
developments in the southern Mediterranean. 
126. Relations with NATO are developing satis-
factorily, but, as mentioned earlier, a number of 
shortcomings need to be settled urgently. Consi-
derable progress can still be made in relations 
with other organisations such as the United 
Nations and, in particular, with the European 
Union and with multinational units which have 
been declared FAWEU. 
I. An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime 
co-operation, Document 1415, lOth May 1994, Rapporteur: 
Sir Keith Speed. 
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